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SUBSTITUTION  OVER TIME IN  WORK MD  CONSUMPTION 
ABSTRACT 
Sir John Hick's  Value and Capital  provided  the theoretical  foundation  for 
an important  element  of modern  macroeconomics.  Intertemporal  substitution  - 
deferral or acceleration  of economic  activity  in response  to the real 
interest  rate and other  incentives  -  is  the mechanism  generally  relied  upon 
in equilibrium  theories  of macroeconomics  to explain  the irregular  evolu- 
tion  of the economy  over time.  Even theorists  who question  the pure 
market-clearing  paradigm  are concerned  with intertemporal  substitution  in 
measuring  deadweight  burden of  fluctuations.  This paper  surveys  recent 
empirical  evidence  on intertemporal  substitution  with  regard  to the type 
of fluctuations  model introduced  in Value  and Capital. 
Robert  E. Hall 
Hoover  Institution 
Stanford  University 
Stanford,  California 94305 Fifty years after the publication of Value p4 Capital, the view of 
the role of the interest rate in macroeconomic  fluctuations expounded there 
has never  been more influential.  According to that view, a higher interest 
rate  brings  a  deferral of spending and an  acceleration of production; a 
temporarily high real wage causes  a burst  of work effort.  A huge body of 
research in the past decade has sought to clarify the details of equilibration 
through  the interest  rate  and to measure the strength  of intertemporal 
substitution effects.  My purpose here is to comment selectively  on the new 
developments  in  intertemporal  substitution  research  as  it  bears  on 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  All  of the  research  fits  nicely into  the 
intertemporal framework of Value and Capital. 
1.  INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION  IN VALUE Jjfl CAPITAL 
The feature of Value and Capital  that makes it good reading on 
intertemporal issues 50  years later is its full exploitation of the principle 
that  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  is  an  application  of  standard 
general equilibrium with the goods identified by date.  The later chapters 
of  the  book  apply  the  principle  systematically,  first  with  respect  to 
intertemporal production and then with respect to consumption. 
In  Chapter  XV,  "The  Planning  of  Production,"  intertemporal 
equilibrium conditions for  the firm  appear.  The  key  condition is,  "The marginal rate of substitution  [in production] between outputs  of any two 
dates must equal the ratio of their discounted prices." (p. 197)1.  When a 
future discounted price rises, intertemporal substitution can take a number 
of forms:  "This  substitution  may take place at  the expense  of output 
earlier than the critical date (reduction of output from now on, in order to 
accumulate stocks which can be sold at the critical date), or at the expense 
of later  output (acceleration of production, using up of the stock of goods 
in process, in order to have as much as possible ready at the critical date), 
or perhaps of both.  I-low far these methods are available depends  upon the 
technical character of tbe product and the technical character of the initial 
equipment:  the durability of the product, the durability of the unfinished 
goods which go to make it, the quantity of such unfinished goods available 
in the initial equipment, and so on" (p. 208).  The tenor of the discussion 
is  that intertemporal  substitution  often makes short-run product  supply 
fairly  elastic, but not invariably.  The largest substitution  effects  occur 
when the price change is temporary, but fully anticipated, for in that case 
the  accumulation effect  operates  as well as  the drawing  against  future 
production.  When the price change is unexpected, only the latter effect 
operates. 
Chapter XVII,  "Interest and the Production Plan,"  rightly insists 
on the  discipline  of discounted  prices  (now  often called "Arrow-Debreu 
prices").  Within  that framework, changes in  interest  rates  have  effects 
that can be restated as changes in sets of prices.  An increase in a single 
one-period interest  rate lowers all  subsequent  discounted prices by  the 
1References are to the Second Edition, 1946. 
2 same  proportion  relative  to  earlier discounted  prices (p  214).  Equal 
changes in all  future  interest rates  "affect the  'tilt' or  crescendo of the 
production plan" (p. 224, emphasis in original). 
Chapter XVIII on the household, "Spending and Lending, "  takes 
the view that  "...the dynamic problem of the private individual ought to 
be conceived  as the choice  of a  most  preferred  collection of streams  of 
commodities, out of the various collections of streams which the individual 
could expect  to be  able to purchase out of a  given  expected stream  of 
receipts."  (p.  227)  Franco Modigliani (with Brumberg [1954]  and Ando 
[1963]) and Milton Friedman [1957]  pursued this view in the life-cycle and 
permanent  income  models  of  the  consumer.  The  view  continues  to 
dominate thinking about consumer behavior.  This view yields a critically 
important  insight  whose  importance  for  fluctuations  theory  has  only 
recently been  appreciated:  "If  the price of X  rises, and  the rise  is not 
expected to be permanent, the income effect will usually be very slight or 
indeed quite  negligible.  The  substitution  effect,  however,  may  well be 
much more considerable than in the preceding  case [of a permanent price 
increase].  For substitution may now proceed, not only in favour of other 
commodities, but also in favour of future purchases of X itself.  The main 
effect  of such  a temporary  rise  may well  consist in the postponement of 
expenditure."  (p.  232)  From  this  point,  it  is  an  easy  step  to  the 
conclusion  that an increase in  the current short-term  interest  rate, with 
future  short-term  interest  rates  held  constant,  will  cause  households to 
decrease current spending and to make plans to spend more in the future 
instead. 
Chapter XX, "The Temporary Equilibrium of the Whole System, 
3 I:  Its  Imperfect  Stability,"  notes  that  an  economy  with  significant 
intertemporal  substitution  is  highly stable  with  respect to  temporary 
disturbances:  "So  long as all  changes  in current prices are regarded as 
being temporary  changes,  any  changes  in  current prices will  induce very 
large substitution effects in a large number of markets.  A rise  in price will 
make  people  postpone  expenditure,  entrepreneurs  postpone  input  and 
accelerate  output;  a  fall  in  price  will  work  the  opposite  way.  This 
substitution over time will be strongly stabilizing; small rises in price will 
produce large excesses of supply over demand; indeed the forces making for 
stability  are  likely  to  be  so  potent  that  it  will  take a  very  violent 
disturbance of data to have any considerable effect on the price system at 
all" (pp. 250-251). 
2.  INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION IN  SUBSEQUENT MACRO- 
ECONOMIC  THOUGHT 
Hicks'  themes  in  Value 4 Capital  saw  some  important 
developments in  the macroeconomics  of the 1950s and  1960s.  As I noted 
above,  the  intertemporal  analysis  of  the  household  flourished  in 
Modigliani's and Friedman's  work,  though the emphasis on  substitution 
over  time  was  slight.  Interest  in  intertemporal  substitution  arose 
primarily in connection with investment theory  — acquisition of equipment, 
structures,  housing, and  consumer durables could  be readily deferred or 
accelerated, depending on the interest rate.  A major turning point in this 
area was Dale  Jorgenson's  [1963]  derivation  of an  investment  function 
4 following the paradigm of Value jiçj Capital explicitly.  Jorgenson derived 
a formula expressing the optimal amount  of postponement of acquisition 
of durable goods given the crescendo of discounted prices. 
The  next  maj  or  development in macroeconomic applications  of 
intertemporal  substitution  was Robert  E.  Lucas and  Leonard Rapping's 
[1969]  paper on labor supply.  Lucas and  Rapping applied Hicks' insight 
that short-run supply may be highly elastic because the offsetting income 
effect is small.  Their application was to a supply issue that received  little 
attention in  Value  and  Capital—labor supply—but which  has  received 
more than its due in business  cycle theory in the past  two decades.  Lucas 
and  Rapping sought to give an equilibrium interpretation  to a fact that 
has  occupied  the  attention  of  almost  every  macroeconomist  since 
Keynes—employment has  business-cycle  fluctuations  of about  the  same 
amplitude  as those of output.  In their account of a boom,  workers  see 
temporarily  high  real  wages and  short-term  real  interest  rates,  which 
makes them substitute toward work and away from leisure.  As Value 
Capital  explained,  the  income effects  from  these  temporary  changes is 
small, so short-run labor supply is quite elastic as a function of these two 
variables.  Lucas and Rapping's claim that the intertemporal substitution 
view  could  explain the ups and downs of the U.S. economy, including the 
great  depression,  was  vigorously  disputed  by  Albert  Rees  [1970]  and 
others, but  the idea has  remained centrally important  in business  cycle 
theory. 
Lucas's [1972]  classic  paper on monetary non-neutrality  gave full 
theoretical  expression to  intertemporal  substitution  in  labor  supply  in 
general  equilibrium.  He  examines a  model  economy  subject  to  a 
5 temporary  real  shock  and  a  permanent  monetary  shock.  Analytical 
convenience requires him to assume that people live only two periods.  As 
a result,  the minimal  income effect  stressed by  Hicks  does not apply to 
Lucas's  model.  Instead,  Lucas  makes an explicit  assumption that  the 
substitution effect  dominates the income effect.  The model has a business 
cycle because some years appear to be  better than others  for  work and 
production. 
Recent work by  Kydland and  Prescott  [1982]  and Prescott  [1986] 
has  seen  the full application of the intertemporal substitution  paradigm 
from  Value  and  Capital.  Households  choose  the  scheduling  of 
consumption  by  equating  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between 
current  and future  consumption to  the  discounted price  ratio,  suitably 
adjusted for stochastic variations.  Households  also choose  the scheduling 
of work with reference to the expected ratio of the current real wage to the 
discounted future real wage.  Businesses  choose the timing of investment 
to  maximize business value,  in  the sense  appropriate  to  the stochastic 
setting.  One  of the most  novel  features  of this  line of thought  is its 
assumption that the major driving force in macroeconomic fluctuations is 
stochastic  shifts  in  the  production  function.  When  conditions  are 
favorable, the real wage is  high and  workers have an incentive to work 
harder  than  usual—a  boom  occurs.  Recessions  are  periods  when 
productivity and real wages are low.  Almost all the features of this type 
of model are controversial—see  Summers [1986]  for a critique—but the line 
of thought has become well established. 
Barro  [1981]  has developed  a related  model  in which the driving 
force  is  government-  purchases  of  goods  and  services,  rather  than 
6 productivity.  The  government  sets  off  a  boom  by  purchasing  more 
output.  The real interest rate rises  temporarily, which stimulates  added 
work effort.  In addition, the higher rate should cause  businesses to defer 
investment  and consumers to defer consumption.  The first prediction is 
fulfilled in data for most countries, but not the second.  Consumption and 
government purchases have a zero or slightly positive correlation, not a 
negative correlation.  To fit the data, the model  would  have to invoke a 
high intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in  labor  supply and a low 
elasticity  in consumption.  To  some extent,  the  evidence supports  this 
combination of elasticities. 
3.  EVIDENCE ON INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION IN SUPPLY 
The hypothesis of high intertemporal substitution  in  labor  finds 
little apparent support  in the very large body of research on labor supply 
at the level of the individual.  This research has consistently failed to find 
substitution  elasticities in  labor  supply  much  above  0.1  or  0.2  for  the 
dominant  demographic  groups  in  the  labor  force  (Pencavel  [1986]). 
However,  the source  of wage variation exploited in panel data is almost 
entirely life cycle in nature,  not  the year-to-year temporary  fluctuations 
that would  reveal the short-run elasticity of substitution.  Existing studies 
of panel  data  do  not  test the hypothesis that modest  temporary added 
incentives  to  work  will  call  forth  significant  additional  work  effort. 
7 Consider a worker earning $10  per hour and working a standard 40-hour, 
5-day workweek.  Would he add 8 hours of work on Saturdays in response 
to an opportunity to earn $12 per hour for a few months?  Studies of panel 
data are unable to isolate instances of this type.  It is common to find 
episodes  when  work  effort  rises  20  percent above  average.  It  is  not 
possible  to isolate the wage changes that might have induced the increase 
in work effort, in the face of large amounts of random noise in measured 
wages for individuals.  In principle, an exogenous  variable that signaled a 
true increase in the wage could solve this problem, but the available instru- 
mental  variables  do  not  seem  to  be  correlated  with  these  temporary 
fluctuations in employment opportunities. 
Aggregate labor supply schedules  are generally found to be quite 
inelastic as well.  Again,  the findings do not settle the issue of the short- 
run  elasticity  of labor supply.  When that elasticity  is  high,  correctly 
measured real wages will be close to constant.  If there is any noise in the 
actual measure of the real wage, the correlation of work effort  and the real 
wage  will  be  close  to  zero.  In  addition  to  standard  measurement 
problems,  wage measurement  may  be complicated by the  tendency for 
actual  wages to  fluctuate less  than the underlying shadow value of time 
(see Hall [1980]). 
My own view  is that the facts about  the labor market  actually 
point  in  the direction of a  combination of reasonably high intertemporal 
substitution  from one  year to another  (though not from one  decade to 
another)  and fairly strong fluctuations in the shadow value of work.  The 
evidence is necessarily  indirect.  First, substantial  annual fluctuations in 
hours  of work are the rule, nOt  the exception.  Volatility is significant 
8 among older workers  with long-term jobs in stable sectors, as  well  as  in 
markets  well  known  for  employment  variations,  such  as  construction. 
Institutions  in  the  labor  market  accommodate,  rather  than  resist, 
variations in annual weeks of work.  Perhaps the most convincing evidence 
is Ramey's  [1988]  finding that firms schedule  output  as if they faced flat 
or declining marginal cost.  If the short-run labor supply schedule were 
inelastic,  firms  would  accumulate  inventories  during  periods  of  low 
demand  and  decumulate in high demand, so  as to smooth employment 
and  limit  the  disamenity  from  variable  weeks  of work.  If anything, 
according to  Ramey,  firms  do  the  opposite.  Seasonal movements  of 
employment  are  substantial,  which  points  in  the  same  direction  as 
Ramey's findings. 
3.1  Characterization of preferences  about work over time 
Value and Capital raised the possibility that short-run supply may 
be more  elastic than long-run supply, because of the absence of income 
effects.  Recent work on labor supply has pushed the idea a little further 
by  recognizing  a difference between short- and medium-run intertemporal 
substitution.  A  convenient family  of intertemporal  preferences  for  this 
purpose  follows  suggestions of Sargent  [1979, p.  371]  and  Kydland  and 
Prescott  [1982].  Let  be the accumulated stock of current and past work 
effort, with persistence  factor w: 
Z1  =  (1—w)>  w5Lv5  (3.1) 
s=O 
9 Because  variations in hours  of work  per  week are small, the measure of 
work effort, L1,  is weeks  of work in period t.  The parameter  w  controls 
the memory of past  work and leisure.  If w  is 0, there is no memory; only 
current  work  effort  matters.  If w  is large (close to its upper  limit  of 1, 
then Zt depends  on a long distributed lag of past work effort.  The worker 
orders work schedules  with  a  (dis)utility  function that is separable over 
time in the z1s: 
T  (  —z )1/1T1 
1/t7—1 
(3.2) 
Define  effective  leisure  as  7—z1  and  actual  leisure  as  i—Li.  The 
parameter o  is both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in effective 
leisure and the long-run elasticity of substitution in actual leisure.  In the 
short run, the elasticity of substitution in actual leisure is greater than a 
by  an  amount  that  is  controlled by  the  memory parameter,  w.  The 
parameter  -y  can  be  interpreted  as  the  number  of  weeks  physically 
available for work. 
A  worker with a high a will  suffer  little from a work  schedule 
involving many weeks of work per  year in one decade and few weeks per 
year in another decade, in  comparison to putting in the same number of 
lifetime weeks  with no  variation from decade to decade.  In a situation 
with  free  choice  of  weeks,  such  a  worker  will  concentrate  weeks 
disproportionately during the years of highest wages. 
10 On the other hand, a worker with low intertemporal substitution, 
a,  but high  memory persistence, w (that is,  close  to one), will  tolerate 
short-term  fluctuations  in  weeks  of  work  but  resist  decade-to-decade 
movements.  This feature makes the preferences  attractive witbin a theory 
in which the deadweight burden from employment fluctuations is small or 
absent.  Kydland and Prescott  [1982]  rely on a slightly more general class 
of  preferences  in  their  model  that  attempts to  rationalize employment 
fluctuations as fully  efficient  responses  to vibrations in technology.  In 
their specification, current  work  can have a role  in the utility  function 
beyond the role implicit in the variable z1. 
To  illustrate  the  difference  between  the  short-run  and  the 
medium-run  responses of labor  supply  to  wage  changes,  consider  the 
following  question:  Let 2N be the number of periods considered  to define 
the medium run, say 24 months.  Suppose a worker increases his weeks of 
work by one percent in periods i—N,...,  1,..., i+N.  By what percent does 
his supply price of a week of work in period I increase?  The elasticity of 
labor supply over the 2N+1 period run is the ratio of the two numbers. 
It  is  convenient to  use  the  A-constant  or  Frisch  labor  supply 
schedule  to  answer this  question.  Let  A  be the  Lagrangian multiplier 
associated with the worker's intertemporal budget  constraint.  The first- 
order condition associated with labor supply is 
OU(L  ,  ..., £ ,..., £  )  1 
8L21 
T  = 
Aw1  (3.3) 
Here  is the real wage in period I stated in period 0 prices.  The Frisch 
inverse  labor supply function is simply  the marginal disamenity of work 
11 stated in wage units: 
1  OU(L ..., L, ...,LT)  (34) 
When  U is additively separable in labor, this can be solved to give current 
labor  supply as a function of the current  wage.  Absent separability, it 
states the supply price of work in one period as a function of the level of 
work  in  that  and  other  periods.  Keeping  A  constant  has  two  inter- 
pretations.  First, equation 3.4  gives the supply price of labor at different 
points  in  time  along  the  same  labor  supply  trajectory.  Under  this 
interpretation,  statements  about  the  response  of  the  supply  price  to 
different levels  of work  are comparisons of the supply price  at  different 
points  in  time;  the  change in  the  level  of work  is  fully  anticipated. 
Second,  the  supply  price  conditional  on  A  has  a  comparative  statics 
interpretation  when the change  has little or no  effect  on  A.  Under this 
interpretation,  equation 3.4 is very similar to (but not quite the same as) 
the compensated labor supply schedule. 
The Frisch labor supply function associated with  the preferences 
considered here is 
T  1  =  (1 
— w)Ectt(7 
—  z8)  (3.5) 
Let z be the common increment to L1  L1,...,  Lj+N.  For simplicity, 
assume  that  the horizon,  T,  is  infinite  and  that  L1  and  have  the 
common value £ in all  periods.  Then some manipulations show that the 
slope of the inverse labor supply schedule  is 
12 —  —  L 1/cr1(i  —  2N+1  3  6 
dx 
—  )o  1  +  w 
The elasticity, e(JV),  of the labor supply schedule is 
—  Lr  N+114 
e(iV)  =  L  L' 
—  ] 
(3.7) 
If there is no memory of past work (w = 0) or if the displacement of work 
is  lengthy  (N  is  large),  then  the  elasticity  is  just  the  intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in leisure,  o, multiplied by  the ratio of non-work 
time to work time: 
= 
—  L 
(3.8) 
The elasticity f(oo)  controls  labor supply over the life cycle.  A  worker 
with an f(oo) of 1 with a wage at age 40 double his wage at age 20 would 
work twice as many hours at age 40.  Because life-cycle variations in weeks 
of work  are  not nearly  this  large,  there  is a presumption  against  high 
values of e(oo);  rather,  the evidence appears to favor values of 0.1 to 0.2. 
If (y 
—  L)/L is 5/47 = 0.11 and the medium-run elasticity of labor supply 
is 0.15, then  o- is 0.15/0.11 = 1.4.  I assume that the medium run is short 
enough that income effects do not offset substitution effects. 
By contrast,  the elasticity of labor supply in the context of a one- 
period displacement (N = 0) is 
e(0)  = 
—  L  1 +  (3.9)  L  1—w 
13 If  memory  decays at a  rate  of  20  percent  per  period,  as  might  he 
appropriate in a  quarterly model, the very short-run elasticity is 1.8/0.2 
=  9  times  as large  as  the  medium-run elasticity.  The  specification  is 
successful iu delivering a high short-run elasticity of labor supply without 
relying on significant decade-to-decade  elasticity of labor supply. 
3.2.  The burden of a fluctuating work schedule 
Except  in  the  polar  case of  perfect  intertemporal  substitution, 
workers resist variable work  schedules.  That  is,  they would choose jobs 
with  constant  weeks  over  jobs  with variable  weeks  but  the  same  total 
hours and total compensation.2 With the intertemporal utility function, it 
is  possible to  compute  the  work  equivalent  of  variability  in a  work 
schedule.  The work equivalent is the added amount of work that a worker 
would  be  willing  to  do  in  exchange  for  a  completely  constant  work 
schedule. 
Most variability of work schedules  is idiosyncratic to the worker. 
Even with a generous allowance for measurement error in annual hours of 
20n the other hand, in a world of perfect foresight, workers would 
prefer to  work  in a labor  market with  variable wages and  consequently 
variable weeks,  as against a market  with a constant  wage equal to the 
mean  of the  wage in  the  other  market.  The  workers  in  the  variable 
market  would earn  and  consume more  than those in the stable market, 
because they would work harder when wages were high. 
14 work, it appears  that the standard  deviation of hours  around  the labor 
supply schedule  is  at least  13 weeks per year, or about 25  percent of the 
normal  level  of work.3  Variations  occur  within jobs—temporary layoffs 
and  deferred  vacations—and between jobs,  as  spells of unemployment. 
Among groups who normally work close to 50  weeks per year, there is an 
inevitable  asymmetry  in  the  variability—weeks  can  drop  by  a  large 
amount but cannot rise above 52. 
The central question of variability, from the point  of view of the 
worker,  is  whether the occasional interruptions in work create valueless 
idle periods (inelastic labor supply) or whether workers  can make valuable 
use  of stretches  of  non-work  (elastic  labor  supply).  The  preferences 
described in  this  section can  give  different answers depending  on  the 
duration of time out of work.  The high-a worker can make good use of 
time off in both the short  and medium runs.  The worker has numerous 
opportunities to benefit from the use of time other than in work and does 
not exhaust the stock of those opportunities even over several years.  The 
low-a, high-w  worker has good alternatives to work in the short run, but 
exhausts  them  after  a  few  months  or  a  year  and  finds  himself 
unproductively idle  thereafter.  The low-a,  low-co  worker cannot  make 
good use of time away from work even in the short run. 
3See MaCurdy [1981] and related papers. 
15 3.3.  Life cycle wage and work profiles 
Because the typical life-cycle wage pattern is smooth, memory as 
measured by the  parameter  w  is  unimportant  in  the life-cycle  relation 
between wages and work effort.  To see this, consider the simple case of an 
individual with exponential  decline  in leisure hours over the life cycle: 
7  —  =  70e0  (3.10) 
The inverse labor supply function from equation 3.4 is 
T  0 
to1  =  — w)Ewe 
U 
(3.11) 
r  i—l  0 
—  1  I  0/0-i  —  (1—w)70Ll—we  J  C 
The rate of growth of the wage is the rate of growth of leisure,  0, divided 
by  the  elasticity  of  substitution,  o-,  without  any adjustment for  the 
persistence of memory of past  work, w.  To put it differently, studies of 
labor supply using panel data on individuals, with instruments such as age 
and education that are associated with gradual life cycle changes in wages, 
will reveal the low elasticity,  not the high elasticity, u7j- 
The key parameter w is identified by the high frequency movements of the 
wage,  such as the coming  and going of special opportunities, not the low 
frequency movements over the life cycle. 
16 3.4.  Panel studies of labor supply 
Pencavel [1986]  and Heckman and Killingsworth [1986]  survey the 
direct evidence on  labor supply for panel data on individuals.  MaCurdy 
[1981]  is one of the leading studies they  consider.  The basic approach is 
the following:  The elasticity of labor supply is the ratio of the change in 
work effort to the change in wage that occurs  as the result of a change in 
one  or  another instrumental  variable.  For example, as a  worker moves 
from age 29  to age 30, his wage typically rises because this is a steep part 
of the age-wage rate profile.  If hours of work also rise from age 29 to age 
30,  there  is  a  positive wage-elasticity of labor  supply.  Given that  age 
effects  are largely anticipated, the response  is a pure  substitution  effect. 
Pencavel's Table  1.22; p.  85  suggests  that the elasticity estimated on this 
basis is somewhere between 0 and 0.45 for men. 
In  view  of the fact  that researchers have not been  able to find 
instruments  that identify temporary changes in  wages (ones lasting two 
years or less), it seems appropriate to view the estimates from panel data 
as  measuring  the  medium-run  elasticity  of  labor  supply,  e(oo)  in  the 
notation of section  1.  The estimates are thus consistent with  short-run 
elasticities of 1 or 2 or even more, if amplification occurs  through memory 
of recent work effort. 
Pencavel devotes considerable attention to the one group of short- 
run exogenous  events whose labor supply effects are well documented—the 
negative income tax  experiments.  Experimental subjects experienced a 
three-year reduction of 30,  50, or 70 percent in effective wages.  Pencavel's 
17 survey reaches the conclusion  that the elasticity of the response  of labor 
supply to these wage reductions was in the fairly narrow range from .06 to 
.19 (Table 1.21, p.  80).  This finding is the single most telling criticism of 
the view that intertemporal substitution is high in the short run. 
The negative income tax findings are less  than  definitive for the 
following  reason:  For good  reasons relating to asymmetric information, 
workers delegate to their employers the determination of weeks of worh. 
Workers shop among employers  with different policies  for setting  weeks, 
but once the worker accepts a job,  the weeks  he puts in at that job are 
largely out of his control.  In particular, if an event occurs that is personal 
to  the  worker,  but  not  within  the  class of events (such  as  disability) 
contemplated  by  the  employment  arrangement, it  is  unlikely that  the 
employer  will  agree  to  a  reduction  in  weeks  ad  hoc.  Employment 
arrangements with given, understood rules are the solution to the problem 
of opportunistic  behavior by  both  employers  and  workers.  Of course, 
workers can always take extra weeks off by quitting  one job and delaying 
taking another job,  but that step involves  the sacrifice  of the advantages 
of seniority.  The finding of small  reductions in weeks  of work in the 
negative income tax  experiments is not inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that much larger reductions can occur  when the marginal revenue product 
of labor  declines  in a downturn.  One is unprecedented and  unfamiliar, 
completely  new  to  the  environment  under  which  employment 
arrangements  have  evolved;  the  other  is  exactly  within  the  historical 
experience that shaped those arrangements. 
Another  reason that  the panel  studies, both  survey and  experi- 
mental,  are  not  good  evidence  against  elastic short-run  supply  is  the 
18 amount  of variability they reveal in  annual  work  effort.  According  to 
MaCurdy  [1981], the standard  deviation of annual hours of work around 
the  predictions of  his  labor  supply function is several hundred  hours, a 
significant fraction of the normal level of around 2000 hours.  The supply 
function  has a different intercept  for  each  worker,  so  all  of this noise 
represents variability over time  in relation  to the worker's own normal 
level.  If the  intertemporal  elasticity  of labor  supply is  as low  as the 
numbers  in  Pencavel's survey,  with  respect to substitution  between one 
year  and  the  next,  then  the  deadweight  burden  of  the  unexplained 
variability  of work is extremely high.  A  more reasonable conclusion  is 
that the low elasticities apply to life-cycle influences but that much higher 
elasticities operate at year-to-year frequencies. 
3.5.  Abowd and Ashenfelter's study of wage premiums for variable work 
schedules 
Abowd and Ashenfelter [1981]  investigate the tradeoff between the 
level  of earnings and  the variability of work  effort  by  asking what  wage 
premium  is  required to  attract  workers  to  variable employment.  They 
consider  the  case  of a  worker  whose  alternative  employment  is  at a 
constant  wage and  where the worker  can choose  the number of hours to 
work, given that wage.  The employer at hand also pays a constant wage, 
but  it  must  embody a premium  because the employer  has  the right to 
make random interruptions in the worker's schedule.  Each year, hours are 
reduced by a random variable with mean p and standard deviation 6.  In 
slightly simplified form, the theoretical expression for the wage premium 
19 they derive is 
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ilere 7 is the fraction of lost earnings replaced by unemployment insurance 
(UI),  is the elasticity of the compensated labor supply schedule, r is the 
coefficient  of relative  risk aversion, and  ii  is the unconstrained level  of 
hours.  The  first  term  measnres  the  desirability  of  employment 
fluctuations  when  there  is  unemployment  compensation.  For  small 
amounts  of unemployment, workers prefer variability because they  value 
leisure at the market  wage,  but receive  unemployment compensation as 
well during  periods of extra  leisure.  The  second term measures the area 
above the labor supply schedule  associated with the average depression,  p, 
of work  below  the  worker's optimum.  The  third term measures the 
burden of stochastic variability. 
Abowd and  Ashenfelter  develop their theory within a one-period 
stochastic setting.  An alternative would  be to consider  the variability of 
hours of work over time instead of over states of the world.  In that case, 
with time-separable preferences,  the coefficient  of relative risk aversion, r, 
would  be the reciprocal of the labor supply elasticity, €.  The second  two 
terms would  combine  into  a  single  term  involving expected  squared 
unemployment, /22+62 
The  empirical  work  carried  out  by  Abowd  and  Ashenfelter 
examined the relation in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the mean 
and  variance  of  unemployment  to  the  actual  wage  and  observed 
determinants  of the  alternative  wage.  A  preliminary study of annual 
20 hours  of  unemployment  yielded  the  estimated  mean  and  variance  of 
unemployment for each  worker.  Then a regression  of the log of the actual 
wage on mean unemployment divided by hours, the mean squared divided 
by  hours  squared,  and  the  variance  divided  by  hours  squared  yields 
estimates of the key parameters. 
Although  the  theory  invoked by  Abowd  and  Ashenfelter deals 
with  a  wage  premium for  employment variability,  the data reveal that 
wages for workers facing more unemployment are lower than are wages for 
otherwise identical workers  in jobs with little unemployment.  In order to 
fit this feature of the data, the estimation process  has to come up with a 
very high estimate of the UI replacemeiit rate, 7.  The estimate  claims 
that the worker receives $2.49  in unemployment benefits for each dollar of 
lost earnings.  In such a world, employers with frequent temporary layoffs 
could attract workers with lower  base wages than those offered  by other 
employers, because each layoff is  a  paid  vacation at over  double normal 
earnings. 
Abowd and  Ashenfelter are  aware that  their  estimated  replace- 
ment  rate  is high.  They  offer some calculations to try to convince the 
reader that the estimates are only a little too high,  and that an alternative 
estimate  of around  one  is  completely reasonable.  I  believe  that  these 
calculations are quite erroneous.  First, they contradict evidence presented 
in Table 4.A.l of the paper which  show that industry average replacement 
rates are in the range of 10 to 25  percent.  These replacement rates seem 
quite  reasonable in the light of nominal replacement rates  of around  50 
percent  subject  to  limitations  in  the  first  week  of unemployment  and 
exhaustion  of  benefits.  Second,  the  calculations  themselves  seem  to 
21 contain  an outright  error.  Rather than simply compare the replacement 
rates themselves, Abowd  and Ashenfelter look at average UI benefits as a 
fraction of total earnings.  This is just the first term in equation 3.12.  To 
convert  the  actual  data  on  benefits/lost  earnings  to  the  form  of 
benefits/total income,  one should multiply by lost earnings/total income, 
which is the unemployment rate  of hours.  According to Table 4.A.1, the 
average worker  lost  27  hours to  unemployment in  1973.  The  average 
amount  of work and unemployment in the same year was 2360 hours, so 
the  unemployment  rate  of hours  was  1.2  percent.  Thus  the  observed 
average UI benefits in 1973 were  0.130 (the  1973 replacement rate) times 
1.2  percent,  or  0.15  percent  of earnings.  By  contrast,  the  "observed 
average"  presented  in  Table  4.5  is  1.10  percent,  almost  an  order  of 
magnitude higher.  The explanatory notes  for Table 4.5  indicate the the 
"observed average"  is calculated as the product of the replacement rate (13 
percent)  and  the fraction  of the sample  who  had  positive unemployed 
hours  (10.8  percent).  Apparently,  Abowd  and  Ashenfelter confused the 
fraction with some unemployment with the unemployment rate  of hours. 
The two differ  by almost an order of magnitude (10.8 percent against  1.2 
percent). 
The fact of the matter is that the estimated replacement rate of 
2.5 is more than an order of magnitude too high.  Even in the alternative 
estimates of Table  4.4,  the replacement rate of  1.2 is about  6  times too 
high.  What accounts for the gross overstatement?  I think that the answer 
is  probably  the  problem  that  dogs  all  research  on  wages—there  are 
important unmeasured individual wage  determinants  that  are correlated 
with  the right-hand  variable.  In this  instance, workers  who are in jobs 
22 with unusually large amounts of unemployment tend to be workers with 
adverse unmeasured earning potential.  It appears to be a hopeless task to 
tease  out  the  small  effects  of  employment  variability  from  data 
contaminated by unmeasured wage determinants. 
3.6.  Ramey's evidence on prodnct supply 
Valerie  Ramey  [1988]  has  assembled  evidence on  intertemporal 
substitution  in  production.  All  of  the  production  substitution  issues 
discussed in Value and Capital are considered  in her work.  She examines 
the joint behavior of output and finished goods inventories in  industries 
that  produce to  stock rather  than to order.  The basic idea  is  that a 
convex  technology  with  rising marginal  cost  and  limited intertemporal 
substitution creates an incentive to produce to inventory in anticipation of 
increases  in  demand.  The  incentive  to  use  inventories  to  avoid 
fluctuations  in  output  is  even  stronger  when  the  firm  internalizes  the 
short-run  labor  supply schedules  of its workers.  Earlier work by  West 
[1986]  and  others  showed that  inventory  investment  does  not  smooth 
production.  Ramey's work interprets that fact as revealing that marginal 
cost is flat  or even downward-sloping.  Her results, taken at face  value, 
require a  combination  of a high elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution 
and  large movements of the shadow wage.  That  is, a boom is either a 
time when workers work much harder in response to a modest increase in 
the  incentive  to  work,  or  a  time  when  economies  of  scale  permit  a 
substantially higher shadow real wage. 
23 The following simplification of Ramey's approach shows  how  in- 
ventory behavior reveals the extent  of intertemporal substitution  oppor- 
tunities.  Within a broader optimization problem through  which the firm 
determines its sales,  there is a sub-problem of minimizing the cost of those 
sales.  Suppose the  expected cost  of producing to  meet  given  sales  is 
proportional to 
F2  [7 y + (x1 —  a  (3.13) 
Here F2  is the  expectation  conditional  on  information at  time  2,  y  is 
output, x is the end-of-period stock of finished-goods  inventories, and s is 
the level of sales.  The parameter y controls intertemporal substitution; if 
the firm perceives  an upward-sloping short-run labor supply schedule for 
its workers or if the technology itself is convex,  will be positive.  The 
parameter  a  controls the  inventory/sales  ratio.  An  identity links  the 
variables: 
= 
X2_1  + y2 
—  (3.14) 
A first-order condition necessary for the optimal scheduling  of production 
is 
F2 [(2 
— 2+i + x1 
— asjjj 
=  0  (3.15) 
This  condition characterizes the  cost-minimizing policy,  for  negative as 
well as positive values of 7 (see Ramey [1988]). 
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=  — 
asj+l  (3.16) 
=  —  — (as11 
— 
The variable  is inventory investment in excess of the amount  needed to 
maintain the level of inventories at its usual relation to sales;  h1 measures 
inventory  investment  undertaken  to  smooth  production  plus  a  purely 
random element related to surprises in sales.  The first-order condition in 
terms of  is 
IIh1  =  7(Yj 
—  E,Yj+j)  (3.17) 
Alternatively, 
=  7(Y1 
— Yji) +  (3.18) 
Here c is an expectation error satisfying E1E1  =  0. 
Equation 3.18 strips the first-order condition to its bare essentials. 
A  firm  with  low intertemporal  substitution  ('y  >>  0)  will  deplete  its 
inventories by setting h1<0 when it is producing more this period than it 
plans  to  produce next  period  (vj-.-Yt+l>O).  Note that  the  inventory 
draw-down affects  the magnitude of  — y4; h1,  and  are all 
variables controlled directly by the firm.  When the optimal output plan 
calls  for  lower output  this period than next  period, the firm  with rising 
marginal cost will accumulate inventories in excess of the level required by 
25 maintenance of the inventory/sales ratio. 
Imperfect intertemporal substitution has a sharp and robust impli- 
cation:  When an outside  event stimulates product demand temporarily, it 
should also cause an inventory draw-down, in the sense of a negative value 
of h.  To put it differently, an instrumental  variable positively correlated 
with  —  should be negatively correlated with h1.  The negative of 
the ratio of the covariances is the instrumental  variable estimator  of 7. 
By  contrast, the  firm  with  perfect  intertemporal  substitution  (highly 
elastic labor supply and  no  convexity  of technology) is indifferent to the 
scheduling  of  production.  Its  only  objective  is  to  maintain  its 
inventory/sales ratio at the prescribed level a, so it always plans for  = 
0.  An instrumental variable positively correlated with  —  will have 
zero  correlation with  excess  inventory  accumulation.  The  instrumental 
variable estimator for 7 will be zero. 
For a firm with decreasing marginal cost (7<0), it is efficient to 
bunch production.  The firm would  produce its output  for  all  periods in 
the  first  period but  for  the  cost  of departing  from  the  normal  inven- 
tory/sales ratio,  a.  Even  in  the face of that  cost,  the  firm  amplifies 
fluctuations in output  so as  to  obtain the economies  of bunching output. 
Equation  3.18  shows  that  the firm  builds extra inventories in the same 
periods  when  current  output  exceeds  expected  future  output.  An 
instrument  positively  correlated  with  —  will  also  be  positively 
correlated with h1, and the IV estimate of 7 will be negative. 
Ramey's model  as estimated is considerably more elaborate than 
the one just discussed.  The cost function is cubic in output and the linear 
term depends  on the wage,  the price of materials, and the price of energy. 
26 There  is  a  time  trend  in  the  quadratic  term.  There  are  costs  of 
adjustment  of the level  of output  in  the form of a  term  involving the 
square  of  — y11.  Finally,  there  are random  shifts in the  technology 
itself, in the adjustment cost term,  and  in the target inventory/sales ratio. 
In principle, the use of a wage in the model means that the estimate of the 
slope of marginal  cost  does  not  measure the  slope  of the labor  supply 
schedule.  Ilowever,  there  is  very  little variation apart from trend in  the 
real wage.  Hence the results are almost exactly the same if the wage is 
omitted  and the  slope  parameter  is interpreted  to  include the  slope of 
labor supply.  To put it another way, the stability of the real wage means 
either that labor supply is highly elastic or that the wage does not reflect 
the true shadow price of labor over the cycle. 
In  Ramey's  work,  the  exogenous  variables  that  shift  product 
demand  and  do  not  shift  product  supply are three  measures of federal 
military  spending,  the  relative  price  of  oil,  a  dummy  variable  for  the 
political  party  of the  president, and  population.  The  seven  industries 
Ramey  studies  are  food,  tobacco,  apparel,  chemicals,  petroleum,  and 
autos.  Except for the auto industry, a dummy for auto strikes also serves 
as  an  instrument.  For the  tobacco industry, a set  of variables charac- 
terizing federal regulation is included.  In  all  seven  induAtries,  the esti- 
mate of y, the slope of the marginal cost schedule, is negative.  In four of 
the seven  industries, the point  estimate of y is more than two standard 
errors  below  zero,  so  the  evidence against  rising  marginal  cost  is 
statistically  unambiguous.  All  seven  of  the  industries  tend  to  bunch 
production during times of high sales.  They typically accumulate inven- 
tories beyond the amount  needed to maintain the normal inventory/sales 
27 ratio at the same time that output is strong because sales are high.  Firms 
with  rising  marginal  cost  would  behave  in  the  opposite way, building 
inventory stocks  in times of weak sales and drawing tbem down when sales 
are  high.  Itamey's  strong  statistical  evidence  in  favor  of production 
bunching is inconsistent with rising marginal cost. 
The bunching of production revealed in Ramey's study means that 
work  effort  is  equally bunched.  Nothing in  the  results  rules  out  the 
possibility that management is setting a work  schedule  that is painful to 
workers because of its  irregularity, but that some kind  of coordination 
failure leaves management with no incentive to smooth the work schedule. 
The  opportunity  to  accumulate and  decumulate inventories means that 
management  could  smooth work schedules al relatively low cost.  But the 
most reasonable conclusion  from these observations, in my opinion, is that 
the disamenity of irregular work  schedules  is sufficiently low to be  offset 
by  fluctuations  in  the  shadow  value  of  work.  Workers  would  gain 
relatively  little by  trading  the current practice of taking  extra  time  off 
when demand is low for taking the same time off every August. 
3.7.  Bus' evidence on overtime 
Mark Bils  [1987]  presents evidence that appears to be unfavorable 
to the hypothesis of high intertemporal substitution in labor supply.  Bils 
argues  that the  effective  marginal cost of labor  input  to the firm  rises 
sharply when output and labor input rise  in an expansion.  He reaches this 
conclusion  through  a detailed analysis of data on the cost of overtime 
28 hours and  on  the way that firms divide  an increase  in  labor input into 
increases  in weekly hours and in the number of workers at work each  week. 
He makes a convincing  case that a larger fraction of incremental hours of 
work  have  to be paid at the 150  percent overtime rate  when  hours are 
close to the 40-hour limit on  straight-time hours mandated  by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act than when average  hours are below  that limit.  If 
firms perceive overtime premiums as an extra cost associated with the use 
of labor at the time  the premiums are paid, then  Bils' conclusion  about 
fluctuations  in  the  effective  marginal  cost  of  labor  are  inescapable. 
However,  as  Bils  points  out,  it  is  far  from  an  obvious hypothesis that 
overtime  premiums are  a  cost.  Firms  may  be  committed  to  paying 
premiums of a certain amount on the average, as part of their employment 
agreements.  Then paying a premium during  one episode relieves  them of 
a future  compensation obligation.  Bils attempts to show that overtime 
premiums are treated as true costs by the firm.  Rather than pay extensive 
overtime  premiums  when  demand  is  strong,  be  argues,  firms  incur 
substantial  adjustment  costs  to  add  more  workers.  Because  the  firm 
should always equate the marginal costs of labor input from adding hours 
and adding workers,  the cyclical pattern of marginal adjustment costs also 
reveals the cyclical pattern of the cost of a marginal hour.  That pattern is 
quite similar to the one inferred directly from overtime premium costs. 
Bils'  position on  marginal labor  costs  is  fundamentally at  odds 
with  high intertemporal substitution  in  labor supply.  One of the ways 
that firms can adjust labor input  is to vary the annual weeks of work of 
their long-term workers.  The firm  should equate  the marginal  cost of 
labor from this type of adjustment to the marginal costs of adding weekly 
29 hours or adding more workers.  If the labor supply schedule  is flat,  and 
adjustment  costs  for  variations  in  weeks  are  minor,  then  cyclical 
fluctuations in marginal labor cost should be small.  Bils' claim to finding 
large  fluctuations  contradicts the  flatness of the supply of  weeks,  even 
though he gives no explicit consideration to the weeks dimension.  There is 
no reason why firms should be running up substantial overtime costs when 
they could increase weeks without raising the marginal cost of labor.  Bils' 
finding needs to be recnciled  with Ramey's evidence of flat  or declining 
marginal  cost.  If the bunching of output raises average  cost  because of 
overtime premiums, then firms should smooth output.  Their failure  to 
smooth suggests  that overtime payments are not a  cost  or that the cost 
reductions  associated with  the  bunching are  large  enough  to  offset  the 
extra overtime expense. 
Bus' evidence is completely convincing that compensation paid for 
the marginal hour  rises sharply when employment is high.  Data on total 
and  overtime hours shows  that an increase  in  total hours from 40  to 41 
increases  overtime by  0.39  hours  whereas  an  increase  from  41  to  42 
increases overtime by 0.50 hours (Bils  [1987], p.  845). The marginal wage 
is 4.6 percent higher at 41 hours than at 40 hours.  Average weekly hours 
in  manufacturing decline by a little over an hour in the typical recession. 
Although these calculations depend on the assumption that the 50 percent 
overtime premium  dictated by the Fair  Labor Standards Act  is actually 
paid, Bils cites evidence that compliance  is virtually universal. 
Bils explains in  detail why the evidence on overtime payments is 
inconclusive: 
The  wage a firm pays takes a very large jump  of 50 percent at 40 
30 hours per week due to the overtime premium.  Workers' disutility 
of working  is  presumably  smoothly  increasing in  hours.  This 
implies workers would  strictly prefer working  some overtime hours 
to working 40 hours per week  (in fact, overtime hours are rationed 
in many instances).  By offering  workers  overtime hours, therefore, 
a  firm  may  incur  some  goodwill,  which  allows  it  to  lower 
compensation in  another  form,  if not then,  at  some other  time. 
The implication is that the effective  cost premium of an overtime 
hour may be less than the 50 percent explicit payment.  (p. 843) 
Bils' response is to try to infer the slope of the marginal cost of labor from 
variations  in  the  cost of adding  workers.  In equilibrium, the firm  will 
equate  the  marginal  costs of labor  along  both  the  honrs  and  workers 
dimensions.  i3ils  hypothesizes adjustment  costs for  adding workers.  His 
formula  for  the  marginal cost  of  an  hour  of work  obtained  along  the 
worker dimension is 
(1 + J)4#2 + q2 log Nj+i  (3.19) 
Here f is  the  amount  of fringe benefits  not  related to  hours  of work, 
expressed as  a  fraction of total  earnings (reported by  the  Chamber  of 
Commerce), H is weekly  hours,  W(ll)  is the average hourly wage at  H 
hours,  w  is  the  straight-time  hourly  wage,  q  is  the  adjustment  cost 
parameter,  and N1  is the number of workers.  Note that marginal  cost  is 
measured  in  units  of the straight-time  wage.  The marginal cost of an 
added hour in the weekly hours  dimension is  W(R), which  is specified as a 
31 cubic in H multiplied by tbe straight-time wage. 
Bus' estimating equation is 
A2  log PT11  =  (1 +J) 
—  + q  (3.20) 
Here  is  the reciprocal of the adjustment  cost parameter  and  ij  is a 
random  disturbance.  All  of  the  variables in  W(R)/w  have  unknown 
parameters,  so  identification  hinges  on  variation  in  W(ll)/w  tbat  is 
independent of variation  in  IXT(ll)/w .  At the most general level, it is 
clear that identification from this source  of variation must fail;  W  is just 
the  marginal  to  W,  so  there  can be  no  independent  variation.  Bils' 
equation does not suffer from perfect collinearity for three reasons:  First, 
there is some variation over time in f, the  element of compensation that is 
independent of weekly  hours.  Second, although  W and W have an exact 
functional  relation,  they  are  not  precisely  linearly  dependent,  so  the 
estimation does not break down numerically.  Third,  Bils uses actual data 
on  average hourly compensation to calculate  W/w,  rather than imposing 
the  relation  between  W and  W  dictated  by  his  theory.  Because  the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics  does  not use  exactly  Bils' formula  to  derive 
straight-time earnings  w from average hourly earnings  W, the dependence 
between W and  W is broken. 
The basic train of logic implicit in Bils' work is the following:  We 
observe the ratio between incremental hours and incremental workers  when 
total labor input rises.  This ratio identifies the ratio of the slopes  of the 
two implicit supply schedules for hours and workers.  If we can determine 
the slope of the implicit supply schedule for workers,  then we can infer the 
32 slope of the supply of hours from our knowledge of the ratio.  The slope of 
the marginal cost schedule  for  workers  can he inferred from  the way that 
the  number  of  workers  changes  when there  is a change in  the  cost of 
workers  without  any  change  in  the  cost  of hours.  In  the data, such 
independent  changes  occur  because  the  BLS  method  for  determining 
straight-time  hourly  earnings  has  some  noise  in  it  and  because  of 
variations in the fixed  element of compensation.  Absent this  variation, 
only the ratio of the slopes would be identified. 
One  of the implicit identifying assumption in Bils' work is that 
the noise in the calculation of straight-time  wages is a genuine measure of 
the cost of adding a worker to the payroll, independent of variations in the 
cost of adding an hour to a worker's weekly schedule. There is no basis for 
this assumption.  If the BLS approach to straight-time  wage measurement 
is really better than the one based on  Bils' formula, then fluctuations in 
W/w ought to be incorporated in W/w as well. 
Quite apart from the objection that the basic estimating equation 
is identified only  by  the  modest  variability  of the fixed  component of 
compensation,  there  is  an  even  more  fundamental  objection  to  Bils' 
procedure  for  measuring  the  slope  of  the  implicit  supply  of  hours. 
Measurement of the slope  of the marginal cost schedule  for  workers  rests 
on knowledge of the allocational price of added workers.  Without  com- 
ment,  Bils  assumes that  the out-of-pocket current payroll cost,  W,  is the 
true effective  cost of obtaining an added hour of work through a new hire. 
But  W includes current overtime and any other element of compensation 
that may not be part of the effective cost of labor.  There is no more basis 
for the use of average hourly earnings,  W,  as the measure of the effective 
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marginal,  W, as the effective cost of an hour in the hours dimension.  The 
criticisms quoted above from Bus apply with equal force to his measure of 
the effective cost of an hour obtained by hiring. 
Bils is unsuccessful, in my opinion, in his attempt to corroborate 
his  finding  of highly  cyclical  marginal  cost  of labor  by  measuring  it 
without  assuming that overtime premiums are a true cost.  The reliable 
finding of his work  is that marginal cost is cyclical  assuming that the out- 
of-pocket costs  of overtime are the true costs.  Ramey's  evidence  that 
firms behave as if marginal cost  was fiat  or downward sloping suggests 
that the assumption  does  not  hold or that the  economies  of bunching 
output are extremely strong.  If overtime costs are not true costs, Firms 
are happy to bunch output even though it appears to add to compensation 
costs through overtime premiums, because the overtime payments go into 
a bank, from which they can withdraw in the future. 
3.8.  Seasonal fluctuations in production and work effort 
Closely related to the finding  that firms behave over the cycle as if 
they had  near-perfect intertemporal  substitution  in  production  is  the 
considerable  amplitude  of  seasonal movements  in  labor  input  and  in 
production.  If labor  supply is  not itself  seasonal,  and if the  marginal 
disamenity of work is a rising function of the amount of work, then work 
schedules  should  not  be  seasonal.  Because  seasons  are  completely 
predictable,  the test of this  proposition is simple.  Barsky and  Miron 
34 [1987]  find the following  seasonal  averages in percent growth at quarterly 
rates for the private non-agricultural sector of the U.S. economy: 
Quarter 
1  2  3  4 
Number of workers employed  —1.65  1.09  0.84  —0.27 
Weekly hours  —1.08  0.74  0.95  —0.61 
Total  —2.73  1.83  1.79  —0.88 
The obvious candidate  for  a  seasonal  shift in  supply would  be the third 
quarter,  when most families take their vacations.  But  both employment 
and hours reach their peak levels in the third quarter  (July, August, and 
September).  Labor input  reaches  its  trough  in  the  winter.  Shifts  in 
demand, related to weather, appear to be the seasonal driving force.  If 
workers  had  a  strong  aversion  to  uneven  work  schedules,  institutions 
would  develop to smooth  employment over the seasons.  For example, 
construction  workers,  who currently  work  very hard  during  the  spring, 
summer, and  fall, and  take the winter off,  would  develop ways  to apply 
their skills in the winter and would  work normal schedules  the rest of the 
year. 
4.  EVIDENCE  ON  INTERTEMPORAL  SUBSTITUTION  IN 
CONSUMPTION 
Although  research  on  consumption in  an  explicit  intertemporal 
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[forthcoming]  for a survey), measurement of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution  has not been a major focus.  My own work  (Hall [1988]) will 
be the primary subject of my discussion.  The work is nothing more than a 
systematic investigation of the proposition developed in Chapter XVIII of 
Value and Capital that a higher real interest rate will cause  households to 
defer  consumption  through  an  intertemporal  substitution  effect.  The 
research measures that deferral in a framework in which income  effects are 
cleanly  controlled.  Earlier research on  the responses  of consumption or 
saving to interest  rates  failed to control for  income effects.  Value 4 
Capital,  through its rigorous application of standard consumer theory to 
the intertemporal  problem, insisted on the importance of distinguishing 
income and substitution effects in the intertemporal problem. 
The essential idea of the research is that consumers plan to change 
their consumption from one year to the next by an amount that depends 
on  their  expectations  of  real  interest  rates.  Actual  movements  of 
consumption  differ  from  planned movements by a completely unpredic- 
table random variable that indexes all the information available next year 
that was not incorporated in  the planning process  the  year  before.  If 
expectations  of  real  interest  rates  shift,  then  there  should  be  a 
corresponding shift in the rate of change of consumption.  The magnitude 
of the response of consumption to a  change  in real interest  expectations 
measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The model of the joint behavior of consumption and asset returns 
employed in this work was developed by Douglas Breeden [1977, 1979] and 
Lars Hansen and Kenneth Singleton [1983].  The joint distribution of the 
36 log of consumption in period I, c, and the return earned by the consumer 
from period i—i to period 1, r,  is normal with a covariance matrix that 
is unchanging over time.  The means of the two variables obey the linear 
relation, 
=  + c1 + k  .  (4.1) 
That  is,  the  expected  change  in  the  log  of  consumption  is  the 
intertemporal elasticity of sbustitution,  ci,  times the expected real return 
pius a constant. 
The  interpretation  of equation  4.1  has  been  assisted by  recent 
developments  in  the  theory of intertemporal  choice  under  uncertainty. 
Epstein  and  Zin  [1987a,  1987h]  and  others  have  applied  a  general 
framework due to Kreps and  Porteus  [1978]  in  order to understand how 
equation  4.1  can  be  derived  from  explicit  preferences  and  probability 
distributions  and to interpret  the coefficient  ci.  The central issue  is the 
relation  between  risk  aversion and intertemporal  substitution.  If  the 
consumer orders uncertain  future  streams of consumption by  computing 
the expected value of an intertemporally separable utility  function, then 
the coefficient a is both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the 
reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Both substitution and 
risk  aversion are  controlled  by  the curvature  of the  one-period  utility 
function, which is controlled in turn by a.  In order to make a distinction 
between substitution  and risk aversion, an assumption must  be relaxed. 
One possibility is to drop intertemporal separability.  Another is to drop 
expected  utility.  In  both  cases,  equation  4.1  results  from  utility 
37 maximization  and  the coefficient  is unambiguously the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution.  Risk  aversion  affects the constant,  k, but not the 
slope, a. 
If data on the expected real interest rate, i,  are available directly 
(from a market for indexed bonds or by subtracting a measure of expected 
inflation from a nominal interest rate), then the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution,  a-, is the slope coefficient in the regression, 
zXc  = ui-1+k+c  .  (4.2) 
Estimation  is  nothing  more  than  checking whether  consumption  has 
tended to grow  more in periods of high expected returns.  On the other 
hand, if data are available only for the realized real interest rate, rt, but 
there  are instrumental  variables,  Xt, so tbat 
=  xJ3 + th  ,  (4.3) 
then  an  estimate  of  a-  is  available by  applying instrumental  variables 
estimation to 
L\c  =  ar1 + Ic + e + q ,  (4.4) 
using z1 as instruments.  In  effect,  the second procedure calculates a 
proxy  for  the  expected real  interest  rate  as  the  fitted  values from  a 
regression of the realized real interest rate  on  the instruments, and then 
estimates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution by regressing the rate 
38 of change of consumption on the proxy. 
The first approach yields estimates of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution,  a, using postwar  data on  consumption changes and on 
expected inflation.  The latter come from Joseph Livingston's survey of 
inflation forecasters conducted every  November.  I have obtained separate 
estimates of a for  the returns  on  each  of three  assets:  Treasury bills, 
savings accounts, and  a  diversified  portfolio of common stocks  (the S&P 
400 portfolio).  For the first two, the point estimates of the elasticity are 
about  0.3,  but with a fairly large standard  error  (also about  0.3)  because 
there  has  been  relatively little variability in expected real  returns.  For 
common stocks, the estimate is .07  with a standard  error of .05,  80  the 
finding of a a close to zero is quite strong. 
The  second  approach can be applied to a longer period of data 
because it does  not require survey evideace  on expected inflation.  With 
annual  data on  consumption changes  and  real returns  on Treasury bills 
over  the  period from  1924  through  1940  and  1950  through  1983,  the 
estimate  of a is  — .40  with a  standard error of .20  (lagged  values of the 
endogenous variables  served  as  instruments).  Evidence against  inter- 
temporal substitution is statistically unambiguous.  A negative value of a 
is inconsistent with standard theory, of course, but the data do not show 
the tendency for consumers  to postpone consumption in times of high real 
returns that would occur  with significant intertemporal substitution. 
The time series evidence on intertemporal substitution in consump- 
tion is far from definitive.  Similar procedures applied to data on hours of 
work  suggest  that  intertemporal  substitution  in  labor  supply  is  low, 
contrary to the conclusion reached in the previous section—see  N. Gregory 
39 Mankiw, Julio  Rotemberg, and  Lawrence Summers [1985].  Some of the 
same  objections can  be raised  in  the  case  of consumption as  in  labor 
supply.  For example, the expected real interest rate used  in my work may 
be no better a  measure of the true allocational intertemporal price ratio 
than is the measured real wage a measure of the true price ratio of labor 
to goods.  Moreover,  panel data on the consumption of individual families 
shows  a large transitory component (see Hall and Mishkin  [1982]).  Just as 
high  variability  in  work  schedules  is  evidence in  favor  of substantial 
intertemporal substitution in labor supply, high variability in consumption 
may be evidence in favor of intertemporal substitution in consumption. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Both as a matter  of theory and  empirical findings, the following 
view of economic fluctuations seems attractive:  Intertemporal substitution 
in labor supply is reasonably high and in product supply is extremely high. 
The movements in  employment and  output that occur  over the business 
cycle carry with them relatively small changes in the real interest rate and 
the real wage,  though there may be a good deal of concealed  variation in 
the shadow value of work.  On the other hand, intertemporal substitution 
in  consumption is very  low;  consumption hardly changes over the cycle. 
When an increase  in government purchases of goods and services  or other 
increase  in product demand occurs,  current production rises.  Investment 
falls,  but consumption remains  more or  less  unchanged.  Although  the 
simple  Keynesian expenditure model describes the  process  roughly, the 
40 richer  model  of Value and  Capital,  with  its emphasis on  intertemporal 
equilibrium, gives a much more satisfactory account. 
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